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Municipal Bankruptcy Act 7 such procedure is meaningless here since the bondholders have the only major financial interest s8
These bonds may be sold to both private investors and the federal government. Until their soundness as investments is proved, however, it is probable
that the national government will find it necessary to purchase the bulk of
them. In fact, the government has provided a $5oo,ooo,ooo revolving fund
for this purpose. 9 The obvious result is that many of these projects are being
entirely financed by federal money. In so far as the federal government has
thus directly and indirectly financed the entire state program, a remarkable
example of legal shadow-boxing is presented. Thus, like the direct federal
program, many of the state developments are vulnerable to a change in Congressional sentiment.
Whether the bonds are owned privately or by the federal government, defaults would lead to an adverse -reaction toward state power activity in any
form. A similar reaction to losses sustained by earlier state developments led
to the present arbitrary constitutional debt limitations. The anomaly of a
sovereign state imposing such limits upon itself emphasizes the need for proceeding on a sound basis to avoid a recurrence of a similar sentiment against
worth-while state activity. Yet, the method used, revenue bond financing, is
the one leaving creditors most vulnerable to the effects of general depressions.
An unwholesome reaction can only be prevented by an integrated state program secured by the taxing power of the state. An adequate supply of private
capital would be assured, thus guarding against changes in federal policy.
South Dakota, by specific constitutional provision, 60 has made the taxing power
of the state available for electric power programs. While similar constitutional
revision in other states may prove a tedious undertaking, it is necessary in
order to assure the continued success of these essential projects. 6'
PROSPECTIVE WAR LEGISLATION
"A bill to prevent profiteering in time of war and to equalize the burdens
of war and thus provide for the national defense, and promote peace" is the
17 5o Stat. 653 (1937), ii U.S.C.A. § 40, (1937), upheld in Bekins v. Lindsey-Strathmore
Irrigation Dist., 5 U.S. Law Week 1004 (U.S. Sup. Ct., April 26, 1938).

s8 General creditors would also sustain a loss, but their interests will probably be minute,
compared to that of the bondholders.
s9 Geffs and Hepburn, op. cit. supra note 34.
6o S.D. Const. art. x3, § I2, discussed in In re Opinion of the Judges, 43 S.D. 635, 177
N.W. 812 (392o).

A similar attempt was made to amend the Wisconsin constitution. Wis. L. 1931, p. 923.
A parliamentary maneuver in 1933 amended the proposal, requiring an additional legislative
vote. Wis. L. 1933, p. 1281. Unfortunately, the amended proposal was defeated in 1935.
61Existing projects could be encompassed by these revisions without losing present work
relief benefits.
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promising title of proposed legislation called the May Bill.' This bill, if passed,
will grant to the next war president powers to do everything President Wilson
did or was authorized to do and to extend their operation to affect classes of
persons and property which were not directly affected during the last war.
In the present era of international instability prospective war legislation
affecting civilians will be passed, as it was passed before the last war.2 Problems
suggested by the general question of prospective war legislation especially
constitutional questions are worth discussing even if Congress is not seriously
considering the May Bill.
Under the provisions of the May Bill, the President is empowered in time of
war 3 to fix prices,4 to register,5 license, 6 and control7 industry and commerce,
to determine priorities in the filling of orders,8 to draft men 9 and to take all
necessary administrative measures necessary to accomplish the purposes of
the act.'0 The draft and compulsory registration sections rest frankly on presidential judgment or opinion. The penalties are dear-infringement of any
presidential order is punishable by a $ioo,ooo fine or one year imprisonment,",
or both-but the classes to which they apply remain to be defined by the
President. The President, it is fair to say, is uncontrolled by any objective
standards and unguided by any proper expression of policy and in fact he
must answer the questions that the legislature would ordinarily answer. A
statement of policy setting forth the ends which the President must pursue in
the exercise of his powers is not contained in any section, but is relegated to
the legally ineffectual title. Yet it is important to note that the power to
appropriate money to set up and run the executive machinery remains in
Congress.
Legislation providing for control of civilian economic activity was unsystematic but plentiful during the World War.2 Control of resources, production,
and distribution of food and fuel was placed in the hands of the President.3 He
was authorized-to cite the items that authors of the May Bill seem to be re-

IH.R. 96o4, also called "the worst measure ever recommended for passage by a committee
of Congress." Anderson, A Bill to Promote Dictatorship, 146 Nation 291 (1938). The May
Bill is latest of a long line of bills concerning prospective war legislation. Editorial, Blueprint
Dictatorship, New York Times, April io, 1938.
2National
Defense Act, 39 Stat. 213 (x916); Naval Emergency Fund Act, 39 Stat. 1193
(917); Army Appropriation Act, 39 Stat. 649 (x916); Joint Resolution (control of railroads)
39 Stat. 387 (i916); Act to Regulate Radio Communication, 37 Stat. 303 (1912).
s§8.
6§6.
4§§I, 2

7§3.

s§ .
8§79§4.
10§ 9. By § u, the Treasury department is required to present to Congress in advance a
plan of taxation "which shall absorb all profits above a fair normal return."
"X §

I0.

12

See generally Berdahl, War Powers of the Executive in the United States 203-212

13

Fuel and Food Act, 4o Stat. 276 (1917).

(1920).

NOTES

enacting too broadly-to license certain processes, 14 to take over and operate
named productive and distributive agencies engaged in the food and fuel
industries, 15 to requisition, 6 fix prices of, 17 and to buy and sell specific kinds of
articles.' 8 The President was authorized, whenever public safety required, to
21
regulate or prohibit exports 9 and imports." He could place orders for army
and navy 2 supplies which took automatic precedence over all other orders received by the manufacturers, and if preference were refused, the President was
authorized to take immediate possession of the plant. The Council of National
Defense, set up by Congress,23 created the War Industries Board24 which became an administrative agency, along with the Food and Fuel Administrations,
through which the President exercised most of his powers. The War Industries
Board, however, existed on presidential authority alone; yet it fixed prices,5
determined priorities of delivery, developed new sources of supplies, bought and
sold for the Allies and the United States. Its "requests" were sanctioned by the
presidential powers to withhold fuel and transportation. Control of property
in the strict sense as distinguished from economic activity was perhaps more
stringent.' 6 Both enemy 7 and American property " could be and were confiscated.29 The President took over and operated the railroads on statutory
authority,3° after private control had failed to meet the requirements of war.
Enemy, neutral, and American shipping and marine construction were brought
under presidential control. 3' The President assumed control of radio stations,
2

'6 Id. at § IO.
"7Id. at §§ 14, 25.
'9 Espionage Act Title VII, 40 Stat. 225 (1917).
20 Trading with the Enemy Act § ii, 40 Stat. 422 (I917).
4Id. at §§ 5, I.
15Id. at § 12.

21 National

Defense Act §

120,

39 Stat.

213

'8 Id. at §§ 27, M1.

(1916).

"Naval Emergency Fund Act § i(b), 39 Stat. 1193 (1917).
3NWar Cyclopedia 68 (1st ed. 1918); Army Appropriations Act § 2, 39 Stat. 649 (I916).
24War Cyclopedia 293 (ist ed. 1918).

But see Pharr & Sons v. Kenny Co., 272 Fed. 37 (C.C.A. 5th 1921).
See generally Berdahl, War Powers of the Executive in the United States
'7 Trading with the Enemy Act §§ 6, 7, 4o Stat. 415 (1917).
's

26

212-219 (1920).

Housing Act, 4o Stat. sso (1918); Food and Fuel Act § iO, 40 Stat. 279 (1917); National
120, 123, 39 Stat. 213, 215 (1916); Naval Emergency Fund Act, § i(b), 39
Stat. 1193 (r916).
'9 Compensation was awarded to persons not enemies. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v.
United States, 261 U.S. 269 (1922); United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341
(1922); Cummings v. Deutsche Bank und Discontogesellschaft, 300 U.S. iiS (1937); Cummings v. Isenberg, 89 F. (2d) 489 (App. D.C., 1937), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 682 (i937). For legislative history of Trading with the Enemy Act, see 5o U.S.C.A., Appendix, §§ 1-24.
28

Defense Act §§

30 Joint Resolution 39 Stat. 387 (ii6); Army Appropriations Act § 2, 39 Stat. 649 (1916);
Railway Control Act 40 Stat. 451 (1918).
3r Shipping Board Act 39 Stat. 728 (1916); Joint Resolution 40 Stat. 182 (1917); Urgent
Deficiency Act 40 Stat. 459 (I918).
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telephone, telegraph, and cable systems.

32

Perhaps the most severe control of

all was over persons; the President was authorized to draft all male citizens
between twenty-one and thirty into military service a3 Finally, for the successful prosecution of the war, the President was authorized to redistribute and
consolidate functions of all administrative agencies.34
The lack of specific enumeration and definition in the May Bill provides the
chief contrast between the bill and the World War legislation. The powers
granted in the May Bill to the President are so uncontrolled and are directed
at persons and property defined so generally that the bill comes close to being
a complete incongruity in a democratic country. The powers granted to the
President by World War legislation in an unsystematic fashion were limited to
specific situations and directed at defined classes of persons and property. It
is apparent, however, that during the last war Congress was too specific or too
slow to give the powers the President needed, for through the War Industries
Board the President exercised powers that were never authorized by Congress
in order to meet situations which Congress did not foresee. To place a President
in a position where he must exercise powers not authorized by Congress in order
to meet situations which Congress did not happen to foresee is dangerous.3 It
is less dangerous to give the President all the powers found necessary in the
last war under some general standard and policy prescribed by Congress and
interpreted by the courts. This minimum of control over the President is desirable and necessary, as an examination of the presidential war powers will
demonstrate.
There are perhaps three sources of the presidential war power. It is ordinarily said that the President must derive his power from the Constitution and
32Act to Regulate Radio Communication § 2, 37 Stat. 303
Stat. 904 (i918).
33 Selective

(1912);

Joint Resolution, 4o

Draft Act § 2, 40 Stat. 77 (1917).

34 The Overman Act, 40 Stat. 556 (1917). With a single exception, United States v. Cohen
Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1920), the World War legislation, when contested, was held enforcible. Food and Fuel Act: Highland v. Russell Car & Snowplow Co., 279 U.S. 253 (1928);
Jacob Ruppert Inc. v. Caffey, 253 U.S. 264 (1919); Espionage Act: Milwaukee Pub. Co. v.
Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1920); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1g1g). Railway Control
Act: Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, 250 U.S. x35 (1918); Public Service Commission v. N.Y. Cent. Ry. Co. 230 N.Y. 149, X29 N.E. 455 (1920). Trading ithtleEnemy Act:
Salamandra Ins. Co. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 254 Fed. 852 (S.D.N.Y. i938). Control of
Telephone Cable System: Read v. Central Union Tel. Co., 213 Ill. App. 246 (i919); Commercial
Cable Co. v. Burleson, 255 F. 99 (1919), dismissed as moot, 250 U.S. 36o (3918). War Industries Board: See United States v. Kraus, 33 F. (2d) 4o6 (C.C.A. 7 th 3929); United States
v. Farland, 15 F. (2d) 823 (C.C.A. 4 th 1926). Selection Draft Act: The Selective Draft Law
Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1917). See generally Berdahl, War Powers of the Executive in the
United States 167-219 (1920); Walsh, War Powers of the President, 24 Case & Com. 297
(1917).
3SLincoln went further in this respect than Wilson. Randall, Constitutional Problems
under Lincoln 523-530 (1926).
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from Congress.3 6 As to these two sources, implication and broad construction
37
have been catalysts in the constant expansion of presidential war power.
Emergency, calling for quick action and resulting in fait accompli, can be regarded as a third source of power.35 It cannot be doubted that some executive
war orders in emergency situations have been presidential legislation.39
As a restriction on presidential war power, the Fifth Amendment and other
articles of the Bill of Rights are not extinguished by war 4oand remain, at least
in a war-weary state of public opinion, a potential check on the President.
The war power of the federal government in respect to non-combatants has
been viewed as vast police power. 4' It is true that in time of war high public
interest outweighs individual rights; idolatry of militarism demands harsh
sacrifices from iconoclasts who will speak their minds and will resist property
seizures, protected only by vitiated rights of free speech,4' press, 43 and due

process of law.44 But in the one case of unconstitutionality of world war legislation, it was the Fifth Amendment that was successfully invoked. In United
States v. Cohen Grocery Co.45 the terms of Section 4 of the Food and Fuel Act,
"unjust and unreasonable rate or charge in handling or dealing with necessaries," were held too indefinite to be within the requirement of due process in
an indictment against the defendant for profiteering. To remove the same
objections to presidential orders under the May Bill it seems clear that Congress or the President will have to enumerate and define the persons and property to which the penal sanctions are directed. The Fifth Amendment, however, will directly reach only presidential orders4 6 through which the act will
3G
Taft, Our Chief Magistrate 139-140 (1925); Randall, Constitutional Problems under
Lincoln 35 (1926). For constitutional war powers of the President, see U.S. Const, art. 2, § i.
cl. 1; § 2, cl. x. For related powers see U.S. Const. art i, § 2, cl. I, c1. 2; § 3; § 7, cl. 2, 3; art.
4, § 4. For Congressional war powers, see Const. art. i, § 8, cl. i -i8.

3 Berdahl, War Powers of the Executive in the United States

265-270 (1920).

38 Randall, Constitutional Problems under Lincoln 35-36 (1926); Berdahl, War Powers
of the Executive in the United States i 9 (192o).
39 Randall, Constitutional Problems under Lincoln 37-39

(1926).

Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U.S. 146 (igig); Davis v. Newton Coal Co.,
267 U.S. 292 (1924); Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall (U.S.) 2 (1866); Ballantine, The Effect of
War on Constitutional Liberty 24 Case & Com. 3 (1917).
40

41 Hamilton

v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U.S. 146 (1919).
252 U.S. 239 (1919).
43 Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (I919).
44 Salamandra Ins. Co. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 254 Fed. 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1918). See supra,
41 Pierce

v. United States,

note 34.
4S 255 U.S. 8i (1920). The effect of this decision was extended to civil cases, HandleyMack Co. v. Godchaux Sugar Co., 2 F. (2d) 435 (C.C.A. 6th 1924), but did not nullify other
clauses of § 4 or other sections of the act. Fannon v. United States, 276 Fed. 2o9 (C.C.A. 9 th
1921); Baird v. United States, 279 Fed. 5o9 (C.C.A. 6th 1922).
4 Exposure to liability by proclaimed presidential order is no worse than the kind of
subsequent liability which juries impose. As Mr. Justice Holmes has said in another connec-
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operate, not the act itself. These orders will raise the question of how such
extensive power can be delegated to the President. Some recent decisions
suggest the doctrine against delegation of legislative powers is another potential check on the presidential war power.
The principle that legislative power may not be delegated by Congress to
the President is founded on the separation of powers, which in turn is founded
not on what the Constitution says, but is implied from what it does in separating grants of legislative, executive and judicial powers. 47 The doctrine48 yields
to practical necessity both on the separation of powers element and on the
definition of what is legislative power. For example, complete separation of
powers is not found even in the Constitution.49 Moreover, some powers delegated to Congress by the Constitution can be redelegated. Congress, Chief
Justice Marshall once suggested, may have powers such as regulating federal
court procedure, which are not legislative, but something "of less interest,"
and are therefore delegables ° Congress can set up a rule of law and make its
operation contingent upon ascertainment of a condition or state of facts by the
Presidents, and can give the President or other executive agency power to
prescribe rules and regulations under the guidance of a standard and in pursuance of a policy declared by Congress.S2
In the emergency of the World War, delegations of power to the President
were hardly serious issues. The power of the President to draft men was summarily upheld.53 The startlingly judicial system of draft boards to administer
selections was said to be "essentially executive."s4 Power in the Secretary of
War to set the zone around military camps within which keepers of brothels
would be subjected to criminal penalties was upheld ss Other powers to issue
tion, " .... the law is full of instances where a man's fate depends upon his estimating rightly,
that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree . . . ." Nash v. United
States,

229 U.S. 373, 377 (i912).

47 U.S.

Const., arts I, II, Ill. There is nothing new about the principle of separation of
powers. Aristotle, Politics Bk. VI, C.2; Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, Bk. XI, c. 6.
48If that old common law maxim, delegata potestas non potest delegari, 2 Co. Inst. 579, is
translated, interspersed, and rearranged in this fashion: power delegated by the Constitution
to Congresscannot be delegated by Congress to the President,the rules about delegation of powers
become intelligible, if not convincing. Duff and Whiteside, Delegata Potestas Non Potest
Delegari, x4 Corn. L.Q. 168, 173-196 (1929).
49Presidential veto power, for example, is legislative, U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 3.
so Wayman v. Southard, io Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 42-47 (1825).

s'Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
s2United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 5o6 (I911); Buttfield v. Stranahan,
(1903).
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U.S. 470

53The Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1917), Sugar v. United States, 252 Fed. 74
(C.C.A. 6th I918); Frank v. Murray, 248 Fed. 865 (C.C.A. 8th 1918).
54United States v. Stephens, 245 F. 956 (D.C. Del. 1917), aff'd, 247 U.S. 504 (1917).
ss McKinley v. United States, 249 U.S. 397 (x918); United States v. Casey, 247 Fed. 362
(D.C. Ohio 198).

NOTES

negotiable scrips6 and to sell enemy propertys7 were upheld. Similar delegations
of power by state legislatures were affirmeds 8 In most of the World War legislation the standards and policies set up by Congress to guide executives were
either expressed with definiteness or the powers delegated were restricted to
a particular situation or named class of persons or property.
How definite the standard and how explicit the policy are problems that
have become acute in post-war decisions. The first section of the National
Industrial Recovery Act9 in light of the war cases would appear sufficiently
definite6° to declare a policy of Congress in a period of economic emergency.
But that declaration was said, in PanamaRefining Co. v. Ryan6' to "declare no
policy and define no standard," and was rejected in Sciechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States62 as neither a standard nor a policy sufficient to uphold the constitutionality of the delegation of power to the President to approve and give the
force of law to industrial codes. Although almost identical legislative aims
had been set out in earlier laws, and, singly considered, were adequate,3 yet
this combination appeared to attempt too much despite economic emergency.
The combination of powers exercised in the last war, re-enacted in a single
piece of legislation, may be open to the same fatal objection. In normal times,
however, the requirement of definite standard and explicit policy has been
more lenient. 64 Indeed, it has been noted that the National Industrial Recovery Act was the first act of Congress declared unconstitutional as an im6s
proper delegation of legislative power.
There may be a distinction between war and economic emergency, 66 but
s6 Security Nat'l Bank v. People's Bank, 287 Mo. 464, 230 S.W. 87 (1921).
7United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. I (1926).
58 People ex rel. Doscher v. Sisson, 222 N.Y. 387, 1i8 N.E. 789 (x918).
"'48 Stat. 195 (1933).
"
6oSection i reads in part:
.... to remove obstructions to the free flow of interstate and
foreign commerce which tend to reduce the amount thereof ....to provide for the general
welfare by promoting the organization of industry ....to induce and maintain united action
of labor and management ....to eliminate unfair competitive practices, to promote the
fullest possible use of the productive capacity of industries, to increase the consumption of
industrial and agricultural products by increasing purchasing power, to reduce unemployment, to improve standards of labor, and otherwise rehabilitate industry, and to conserve
natural resources."
6 293 U.S. 388, 431 (1934).
6 295 U.S. 495 (i934).
63For example, the River and Harbor Act §3o, Stat. 1153 (i899), giving the Secretary of
War power to require alteration of any bridge he believes "an unreasonable obstruction to
free navigation.... ." was held a valid delegation of power. Union Bridge Co. v. United
States, 204 U.S. 364 (19o6).
6 See Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928); New York Securities Corp. v.
United States, 287 U.S. 12 (1932); Mahler v. Eby, 221 U.S. 194 (igio); Mutual Film Corp. v.
Industrial Commission, 236 U.S. 230 (1914).
6
sNote 79 L. Ed. 474, 487, n. 47 (1934).
6 Emergency does not create, but furnishes the occasion for the exercise of power. Home
Building & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425-426 (I933). See Avent v. United
States, 266 U.S. 127 (1924).
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the Court has not distinguished between war-time and peace-time delegations
of power.7 The Court, it is believed, will have a choice; it can follow either
the looser war decisions or the stricter N.R.A. decisions. It is unquestionable
that if the Court follows the reasoning of Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States and PanamaRefining Co. v. Ryan, legislation like the May Bill will be
unconstitutional, except insofar as it is made specific, because it does not
sufficiently control the discretion of the President. It is quite possible that in a
war situation the Court will confess to an error in judicial statesmanship."
Otherwise, Congress will be hard put to it to delegate enough power to the
President for the requirements of war. How to fight a successful war yet avoid
the evils of dictatorship is a political problem which intelligent legislation
can help solve.
The possibility of dictatorship on excuse of war, a danger common to all
democracies, will be accentuated by careless prospective war legislation in the
United States where the President holds a whip hand over foreign relations.
War can be declared only by Congress,6 9 but it is beyond question that the
President as a matter of practical politics can force the country into war. 70
War can end only'by treaty7' which the President must negotiate.72 The risk of
prospective war legislation giving immense power should be taken, if at all,
only after widespread debate and consideration. It may be desirable to advertise what the people at home73 and potential adversaries abroad may expect
in event of another war. It is arguable that democracies must be able in event
of war to do everything the modern dictatorships can do-and do it first.
That military organization must result in dictatorship is a proposition denied
by American experience. 74 The war presidents have so far resisted temptations
of autocracy and have secured Congressional assent or ratification on questions
5

of powers and policies.7
6
7Cases dealing with delegation of peace-time powers have been cited in cases upholding
delegations of war-time powers. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (I8gi), cited in The Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 389 (1917); United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272
U.S. I, 12 (I926).

68Since the kind of legislation in question deals with internal control of civilians, it seems
unlikely that the delegation of power issue is irrelevant as has been held in regard to legislation on external affairs. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
70 Taft, Our Chief Magistrate 94 (X925).
69 U.S. Const., art I, § 8, cl. i.
71Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 25I U.S. 146 (igIg).
2 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The World War was terminated, however, not by President
Wilson's treaty, which was repudiated, but by Congress. Joint Resolution, 41 Stat. xi59 (i92I).
73Anderson, A Bill to Promote Dictatorship, 146 Nation 29i (1938).
74 Washington was offered dictatorship; Lincoln exercised one; Wilson, it was seriously
suggested by Senator Warren G. Harding, should have been made a dictator; yet the country
has remained a democracy. Berdahl, War Powers of the Executive in the United States 18,
203 (1920).

7s Randall, Constitutional Problems under Lincoln 38, 55-59 (I926); Berdahl, War Powers
of the Executive in the United States 204-205 (I92O). The ratification cures the illegality
of prior acts of the President. Prize Cases, 2 Black (U.S.) 635, 67o--671 (1862).
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Perhaps the presidential war measures could best be controlled, yet meet
the requirements of practicality in war administration by offsetting presidential discretion with threat of subsequently exercised judicial discretion
both operating under policies set forth by Congress. Thus the powers to fix
prices, to requisition, to take over and operate, to draft, to register citizens and
civilian organizations, to license, and to create all necessary administrative
agencies ought to be directed to specific situations, objects, classes of persons
and property so far as Congress is in good faith able to foresee the contingencies of war. But since Congress cannot foresee all the possible contingencies,
the same powers should also be delegated generally to the President, to be
exercised only in situations not prescribed by Congress, each accompanied by
a provision that all determinations and orders of the President must be reasonably adapted to an equalization of the burdens of the successful prosecution
of the war.76 Reasonableness is a standard which the courts recognize and
understand. It is a standard which has been imposed upon a statute by implication. 77 As a standard it has a flexibility which may be useful in dealing with
the peculiar problem of war legislation. It will compel the President to justify
his determinations and orders in such a way as to make them judicially palatable. 78 The threat that they may turn out to be unpalatable is in itself a limitation on the executive power. So the threat of unenforcibility of judgments and
decrees during war frenzy will temper the judicial discretion.79 On the other
hand the Court would be emboldened by a war-weary public opinion"° to check
the President within the latitude of the term, "reasonable."
It is apparent that a challenge of constitutionality before war is declared
may be procedurally impossible because such legislation becomes operative
only on declaration of war and no person will be in a position to generate a case
or controversy. A test of constitutionality may not be possible even under the
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act 8' in view of the strong dicta of the Supreme
Court against purposeful suits looking to a test of constitutionality12 and the
16As policies, equalization of burdens seems inevitable and successful prosecution selfevident.
77 Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 Stat. 2o9 (i8go), 15 U.S.C.A. § i; Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (I911).
7'The Fifth Amendment will require specificity of persons and property sought to be
affected. United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (192o).
79 See Ex parte Merryman, Fed. Cas. No. 9, 487 (1816); Randall, Constitutional Problems
under Lincoln, 118-139, 16x-162 (1926).

so For view that public opinion is the real limitation on delegation of powers, see Goodnow,
Administrative Law in the United States 55-56 (19o5).
"128 U.S.C.A. § 400 (1934).
8"Hughes, C.J., and Brandeis, J., concurring, Ashvander v. T.V.A., 279 U.S. 288, 325,
346 (i935)- Cf. Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n., 277 U.S. 274 (I928); Liberty Warehouse v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70 (1927); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249
(1932). See Const., Art. III, § 2, cl. i; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (2936);
Borchard, Justiciability, 4 Univ. of Chi. L. Rev. i (1936).
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indecisiveness of the lower federal courts on the question.3 After a declaration
of war a fair test of constitutionality may be politically impossible. It is
therefore important that Congress draft an act with some safeguards, because
they may be the only safeguards.
To place much faith in legal tests of constitutionality of any war legislation is improvident at any time and surely a delusion after war has been declared. But the term, "reasonable," will allow the judiciary a check if that
resource becomes politically advisable. Under the same political circumstances
Congress too has a check, for Congress still holds the purse strings. It cannot
appropriate money for war purposes for more than two years at a time.4 The
May Bill contains provision for taxation' s but not for appropriation. This
powerful democratic weapon in the hands of parliamentary bodies, even as a
check upon the war power of the executive, should not be overlooked. Lincoln
did appropriate money without the assent of Congress, but Congress nevertheless ratified his use of Treasury funds.86 Congress probably could appropriate a
large sum contingent upon declaration of war.87 But aside from the uselessness
of so doing, Congress should retain its power to appropriate and to cut off
appropriations as a fundamental check upon the war power of the President.

PAROL EVIDENCE AND THE BONA FIDE PURCHASER
No aspect of the law has presented more confusion than the parol evidence
rule as applied to the interpretation of written instruments. The prevailing
common law rule, which is still followed in many jurisdictions, is the so-called
"clear meaning" rule, which permits parol evidence to explain the terms of the
written instrument only where the terms are ambiguous.' In contrast, the
"liberal" rule permits evidence to explain the intended meaning of the words of
the instrument even where the words are unambiguous as used in their ordinary
83See Fosgate Co. v. Kirkland, ig F. Supp. 152 (S.D. Fla., 1937). Cf. S.E.C. v. Electric
Bond & Share Co., x8 F. Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y., 1937); Boggus Motor Co. v. Onderdonk, 9 F.
Supp. 95o (S.D. Tex., 1935). As to contesting tax statutes, see amendment, 49 Stat. 1027

(i935);

Beeland Wholesale Co. v. Davis, 88 F. (2nd) 447 (C.C.A. 5th 1937).
Perhaps it is not preposterous to assert that the chief of staff of the army, or the chairman
of the committee on military affairs could bring a mandamus against the Secretary of Treasury to compel him to submit to Congress a plan of war taxation in accordance with a requirement like Section ii of the May Bill (note 9 supra). This controversy passes the area of the
moot case and the advisory opinion. 36 Col. L. Rev. ix69 (1936). It will lead to a decision
which will prevent parties from acting or refusing to act at their peril. 49 Harv. L. Rev.
1351 (1936). It will be difficult to confine the decision to the narrow mandamus issue; the
purpose of the taxation requirement will be in question, and the answer will involve the
validity of the entire bill.
84 Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
ss § II.
86Berdahl, War Powers of the Executive in the United States IIO-Ili
87See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. i (i935).

x 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 2461 (2d ed. 1923).

(1920).

